National Football Post Tavern Talk

TAVERN TALK THROWBACK TUESDAYS

FIVE THINGS THAT STILL BOTHER ME FROM WEEK 13

1.  Sometimes, when you have a great defense, you can make mistakes with game management and not have to answer questions later.  Here is an example of what teams should not to do at the end of games: ALL MY COMMENTS ARE IN CAPS

NEW ORLEANS TIED THE GAME AT 20-20, HELD THE BUCS AND GOT THE BALL BACK WITH 2 TIMEOUTS LEFT....

New Orleans Saints at 3:50

1-10-NO 7 (3:50) P. Thomas up the middle to NO 8 for 1 yard (G.White, R.Sims).

2-9-NO 8 (3:11) (Shotgun) D. Brees pass short middle to B.Miller to NO 17 for 9 yards (R.Barber). P18

1-10-NO 17 (2:33) D. Brees pass short left intended for M. Colston INTERCEPTED by J. Phillips at NO 30. J. Phillips to NO 17 for 13 yards (M. Colston).

Tampa Bay Buccaneers at 2:24

TAMPA HAS THE BALL AND HAS TO GET A FIRST DOWN TO WIN THE GAME WITHOUT GIVING THE BALL BACK OR REDUCE THE COLLECTION OF TIMEOUTS FROM NEW ORLEANS.  TOUGH SPOT AND THIS IS WHERE CRITICAL PLAY CALLING IS SO IMPORTANT. 

1-10-NO 17 (2:24) W. Dunn right tackle to NO 17 for no gain (S. Shanle, J. Vilma).

Timeout #2 by NO at 02:18.

THE RIGHT CALL, NOT THE RIGHT RESULT, BUT YOU HAVE TO TAKE THE TIMEOUT AWAY. 

2-10-NO 17 (2:18) J. Garcia pass incomplete short middle to A. Smith.

HERE IS WHERE IT GETS A LITTLE STICKY, KNOWING HOW PREPARED JON "LOVE YOU BRO" GRUDEN IS WITH HIS OFFENSE. HE PROBABLY GAVE GARCIA THREE OR FOUR PLAYS TO RUN DEPENDING ON THE PREVIOUS LOOK.  NEW ORLEANS IS EXPECTING RUN ALL THE WAY AND HAS STACKED THE LINE.  GRUDEN PROBABLY HAD A CALL HE LIKED AND FOR WHATEVER REASON THE RESULT WAS BAD ON TWO FRONTS -- NOT GAINING ANY YARDS AND NOT TAKING A TIMEOUT FROM THE SAINTS.   

3-10-NO 17 (2:14) (Shotgun) J. Garcia sacked at NO 19 for -2 yards (B. McCray).

Two-minute warning.

 IF THEY HAD RUN THE CLOCK DOWN ON THE PREVIOUS PLAY, THE SAINTS WOULD HAVE NOT CALLED A TIMEOUT AND LET THE TWO-MINUTE WARNING COME ABOUT.  BUT WITH 14 SECONDS BEFORE THE TWO-MINUTE WARNING, AN INCOMPLETE PASS WOULD STOP THE CLOCK BEFORE THE TWO-MINUTE WARNING, AND ONLY A RUN OR SCREEN WOULD KEEP THE CLOCK MOVING.  AGAIN A TOUGH PLAY CALL. YOU WOULD MUCH RATHER HAVE THE CLOCK AT 2:07 TO GIVE YOU A RUN-PASS OPTION THAN AT 2:14 AND HAVE IT BE A CONTROLLED PASS OR RUN.  NEVER CALL A TIMEOUT UNDER 2:09, OR YOU BRING THE RUN-PASS OPTION INTO THE PLAY. 

4-12-NO 19 (2:00) (Field goal formation) M. Bryant 37-yard field goal is GOOD, Center-A. Economos, Holder-J. Bidwell.

NO 20 TB 23, 4 plays, -2 yards, 0:29 drive, 13:05 elapsed

NOW THE SAINTS GET THE BALL BACK WITH 1:50 LEFT, ONE TIMEOUT AND ONLY NEEDING A FIELD GOAL TO TIE THE GAME.  HOW GOOD IS TAMPA'S DEFENSE? 

2.  Many of you saw last night’s Jacksonville-Houston game, but at the end of the half, there was some real mis-management or mistrust of the Jacksonville defense.  Here is the situation...all my comments are always in CAPS. 

Houston Texans at 3:02

JACKSONVILLE LOST A CHALLENGE EARLIER IN THE GAME AND IS DOWN 10-0.  SO THEY HAVE TWO LEFT AND NEED TO GET THE BALL BACK. 

1-10-HST 24 (3:02) S. Slaton right tackle to HST 27 for 3 yards (P. Spicer).

CALL A TIMEOUT HERE BUT LET THE CLOCK RUN DOWN A LITTLE.  YOU WANT TO PUT THE TEXANS IN A TOUGH SPOT WHERE YOU FORCE RUNS, AND LETTING THE CLOCK RUN DOWN HELPS THIS CAUSE.  IF YOU’RE THE TEXANS, YOU DON’T WANT TO GIVE THE BALL BACK AND NEED A FIRST DOWN TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING. 

2-7-HST 27 (2:29) S. Rosenfels pass short left to K. Walter pushed ob at JAX 43 for 30 yards (R.

Nelson).

 A KILLER PLAY … NOW THE JAGS NEED TO LET THE CLOCK WORK FOR THEM. 

1-10-JAX 43 (2:01) S. Rosenfels scrambles right end pushed ob at JAX 40 for 3 yards (B. Williams).

PENALTY on JAX-B. Williams, unnecessary roughness, 15 yards, enforced at JAX 40. X10

Two-minute warning.

1-10-JAX 25 (1:52) S. Rosenfels pass short middle to S. Slaton to JAX 21 for 4 yards (T. McDaniel; D. Harvey).

PENALTY on JAX-B. Williams, defensive holding, 5 yards, enforced at JAX 25 - No Play. X11

1-10-JAX 20 (1:42) S. Rosenfels pass short left to J. Dreessen to JAX 10 for 10 yards (G. Sensabaugh).

 JACKSONVILLE HAS ONE TIMEOUT LEFT. 

Timeout #1 by HST at 01:31.

1-10-JAX 10 (1:31) S. Rosenfels pass incomplete short left to S. Slaton (B. Williams).

2-10-JAX 10 (1:26) S. Rosenfels pass short left to A. Johnson to JAX 9 for 1 yard (R.Mathis).

HOUSTON WORKS THE CLOCK TO ITS FAVOR, CALLING A TIMEOUT AS IT RUNS DOWN, TAKING ALL 25 SECONDS OF THE PLAY CLOCK. THE JAGS SHOULD HAVE CALLED A TIMEOUT AT THE END OF THE PLAY.  THIS WOULD HAVE FORCED THE TEXANS TO AT LEAST CONSIDER A RUN ON THIRD DOWN AND KEEP THE CLOCK WORKING FOR THE JAGS.  BUT WASTING THIS TIME SHOWED NO CONFIDENCE IN YOUR DEFENSE AND YOU WERE CONCEDING THREE POINTS.  THE JAGS NEEDED A PLAY TO MAKE BEFORE THE HALF TO GIVE THEM SOME LIFE. 

Timeout #2 by HST at 00:41.

3-9-JAX 9 (:41) S. Rosenfels pass short middle to A. Johnson to JAX 3 for 6 yards (M. Peterson).

Timeout #2 by JAX at 00:33.

4-3-JAX 3 (:33) (Field goal formation) M. Turk to JAX 12 for -9 yards. FUMBLES, and recovers at JAX 12. M. Turk pass incomplete short right to O. Daniels.

IT IS FUNNY HOW YOU CONCEDE POINTS AND END UP MAKING A PLAY. 

3.  I am sure that if Green Bay head coach Mike McCarthy had to do it again he would have gone for it on fourth-and-one to at least keep the Panthers’ offense backed up and had a more conservative approach.  If the ball is backed up with the game tied, this would have reduced the play calls of the Panthers.  On their play sheet, teams have a small number of plays when backed up and don't change often. This is a key game situation to practice each Friday for the defense.  If you hold a team when it’s backed up, you can gain tremendous field position for the offense. 

4.  I am still amazed how Jay Cutler threw the ball in the rain and wind of the Meadowlands last Sunday.  The way he played never really showed how much a factor the weather was in the game.  He reduced the its impact, and for me that was remarkable.  That’s one game I will always remember. 

5.  I think the speed of the Pittsburgh defense is amazing, and playing on Field Turf only enhances it.  Given how fast the Steelers played, Coach Mike Tomlin is probably telling Dan Rooney to consider putting it down in Heinz Field. 

COACHING/LEADERSHIP IDEA OF THE WEEK...

THIS WEEK’S IDEA COMES FROM PARTHA BOSE, WHO WROTE A WONDERFUL PIECE ENTITLED ALEXANDER’S GREAT ART OF STRATEGY.  THIS APPLIES TO NFL TEAMS AS THEY PREPARE TO IMPROVE THIS OFF-SEASON. 

The Dawn of Strategy

Alexander was to frame five important advances in

strategy that remain with us today. They began even

when he was still a youngster, going to battle alongside

Philip, his father, and continued during his own rule.

1. The End of the Full-Frontal Assault. Alexander

demonstrated time and time again how a smaller army

could defeat a larger competitor. Influenced by a book

by Xenophon on specialization of labor, Alexander and

Philip divided their cavalry into discrete units with different

tasks that helped them overcome superior forces.

Invited to intervene in the second Sacred War, they

marched the Macedonian army south toward central

Greece, but instead of attacking the Locrians at Amphissa,

they turned east and occupied Elatea. The

town was strategic because it was there that people

from the three most powerful Greek states — Athens,

Thebes and Sparta — had to pass to enter northern

Greece. By capturing Elatea, the Macedonians controlled

passage to the north. That type of opportunistic

capture of a town to prepare the ground for a broader

objective — the defeat of the powerful Greek city

states — was revolutionary.

2. The Application of Strategy, not Tactics Alone.

After capturing Elatea, they sat tight for almost a year,

planning, preparing and testing their next set of moves,

but not attacking, since they knew this would stretch

their communication and supply lines and force their

troops to travel a long distance to meet the enemy.

This demonstrated that in war, as in business and politics,

the essence of strategy can be about choosing

what not to do.

3. Selecting Where to Battle. The Greek city states

readied themselves for battle, choosing Chaeronea.

That couldn’t have suited Philip and Alexander’s purposes

better, since the plains were large flat surfaces,

which meant that the Macedonian cavalry and phalanxes

could both operate at optimum speed and maneuverability.

Chaeronea was one of the first examples of armies

making a strategic decision about where they wanted

to fight the enemy in battle. The “where-to-compete”

decision has become a core strategic issue for business,

military and political organizations today. The Allied

forces’ D-Day invasion of Normandy exemplified

the where-to-compete decision. A business example

was offered by Honda when it invaded the United

States, first with its mopeds, then motorcycles and

then cars, at each stage choosing where to compete

against entrenched, powerful competitors such as

Harley-Davidson and the U.S. auto manufacturers.

4. When to Enter and When to Exit. The Macedonians

confused the enemy, trying to make alliances

with Thebes and Athens against each other, and trying

to neutralize other potential allies. They knew the

importance of when to play offensively and when to

play defensively. Indeed, they paid particular attention

to securing an exit route from Chaeronea, should a retreat

be required. Interestingly, multinational corporations

expanding globally have detailed plans and prepare

for months, if not years, for the when-to-enter

decision, but few have any plans for a when-to-exit

decision, leaving that as the soft underbelly of their

strategies.

5. The How to Battle or Compete Decision. Every

move of the Macedonians prior to war — from positioning

to timing to feints and deceptions — was targeted

at delivering maximum damage to the enemy at

the least possible cost to themselves.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Partha Bose is marketing director of

Allen & Overy, one of the largest law firms in the world.

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